O stracism, or the exclusion of an individual from social interaction, is a persistent phenomenon in human groups 1 . Ostracism is distinct from the other major type of social exclusion, social rejection 2 . Whereas ostracism consists of simply neglecting or avoiding another individual 2 and is subjectively characterized by the feeling of being ignored 3 , social rejection is explicit, purposeful and often aggressive in nature 2 . However, despite its relative subtlety, ostracism can have more severe consequences than explicit social rejection and even bullying for both the mental and physical health of the excluded individual 1, 4 . Indeed, a large body of evidence demonstrates that being ostracized is highly aversive, resulting in threatened fundamental psychological needs of belonging, self-esteem, meaningful existence and sense of control 1 , reduced work satisfaction and increased staff turnover rates 3 , increased physiological stress responses 5 and activation of brain regions that overlap with those processing physical pain 6 . The detrimental consequences of ostracism are typically attributed 1, 7 to its putative primary evolutionary function as a low cost solution to the free-rider problem [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . In line with this view, theoretical accounts of ostracism commonly conceptualize it as a motivated instrument to punish or discipline free-riders and other annoying deviants 7, 14, 15 , such as aggressive upstarts 16 or individuals with a contagious disease 9 . Experimental studies support this instrumental account of ostracism, by showing that ostracism, especially if it is coordinated, can promote cooperation [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] . Similarly, social psychology research has shown that ostracism is used instrumentally to punish burdensome individuals (for example, individuals who are dispositionally disagreeable 22 , which is predictive of free-riding 23 , or individuals who are bad co-players in computerized games [24] [25] [26] ). However, there are several characteristics of real-world ostracism that are not well accounted for by the instrumental view. First, the victims of real-world ostracism often appear to be selected randomly 27 . Furthermore, the incidence of ostracism reported in samples from the general population is very high (for example, daily ostracizing events) 28 , and occurrences in which the ostracizers (sources) are oblivious of the ostracized (target), or for which the reason for ostracism is unclear, are more common than occurrences of instrumentally motivated ostracism 28 . For example, a recent study of workplace ostracism demonstrated that an individual's perception of being ostracized was unrelated to others' intention to ostracize 29 . Moreover, ostracism often takes place in dyadic interactions 28, 30 , rather than in coordinated group actions that have been the focus of research on instrumental ostracism and cooperation [18] [19] [20] . These findings suggest that a substantial degree of experienced ostracism might be incidental rather than instrumental, raising the possibility that the reasons for the high prevalence of ostracism among humans are not fully accounted for by the instrumental view.
Here, we propose that ostracism among humans can be caused incidentally by self-organization of social interaction partners who intend to maximize rewards and avoid punishment, without instrumental motivation for ostracism. This form of ostracism is an emergent phenomenon, a macro-level pattern, which is not reducible to beliefs and desires of individuals to ostracize 31. Ostracism as an emergent phenomenon entails a radically different explanation from the instrumental account. The instrumental and emergence accounts of ostracism are complementary rather than mutually exclusive, as it is clear that instrumental ostracism occurs in the real world 30 and the two forms of ostracism can co-exist in principle. Notably, although the possibility that experienced ostracism might be incidental has been proposed previously 3, 32 , the scope of, and the actual mechanisms causing, incidental ostracism are not well understood. We tested, and corroborated, the emergence account of ostracism using real-world social networks, a series of behavioural experiments, and computational analyses.
A growing body of empirical literature on dynamic social networks provides clues on how ostracism could emerge incidentally. When individuals choose partners to interact with, they form and sever network links with others, which can be beneficial for cooperation [33] [34] [35] [36] . Cooperation is facilitated because partner choice establishes relationships (links) between individuals contingent on past Ostracism, or social exclusion, is widespread and associated with a range of detrimental psychological and social outcomes. Ostracism is typically explained as instrumental punishment of free-riders or deviants. However, this instrumental account fails to explain many of the features of real-world ostracism, including its prevalence. Here we hypothesized that ostracism can emerge incidentally (non-instrumentally) when people choose partners in social interactions, and that this process is driven by simple learning mechanisms. We tested this hypothesis in four experiments (n = 456) with economic games in dynamic social networks. Contrary to the instrumental account of ostracism, we find that the targets of ostracism are not primarily freeriders. Instead, incidental initial variability in choosing partners for social interactions predicts later ostracism better than the instrumental account. Using computational modelling, we show that simple reinforcement learning mechanisms explain the incidental emergence of ostracism, and that they do so better than a formalization of the instrumental account. Finally, we leveraged these reinforcement learning mechanisms to experimentally reduce incidental ostracism. Our results demonstrate that ostracism is more incidental than previously assumed and can arise from basic forms of learning. They also show that the same mechanisms that result in incidental ostracism can help to reduce its emergence.
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Nature HumaN BeHaviour behaviour (for example, being cooperative). Crucially, this implies that as people select partners, others are excluded from that interaction. This will be the case even if individuals have no intention of punishing free-riders, but simply seek out payoff-maximizing interactions. Thus, ostracism might be a natural consequence, or byproduct, of partner choice in social networks, a relationship that appears to have been largely overlooked (but see discussion in ref. 34 ). Furthermore, theoretical work on the formation of social networks through partner choice has shown that associative reinforcement learning, in which agents repeat rewarded actions and avoid punished actions, can result in considerable social network structure, in which some agents are less popular than others, even in simple games 37 . Against this background, we hypothesized that ostracism can emerge incidentally if people make choices about interaction partners based on what they learnt from previous interactions. Incidental ostracism would therefore be a side effect of the same processes that lead to reciprocity in social networks. Distinct from the instrumental account, which predicts that people instrumentally ostracize poor interaction partners, such as free-riders 11, 17 , our emergence account predicts ostracism (some people are excluded from interactions) also in the absence of free-riding or deviant behaviour. To illustrate, if students on the first day of term randomly select a possible friend in the class or dormitory, and continue to interact with the same person if the experience was positive, some students might become, and stay, ostracized purely by chance (that is, without free-riding). Notably, this would be evident even if the ostracized students objectively were as nice as the popular ones, and no motivation for ostracism existed in the group. This is an example of path dependence 38 , which entails that early random outcomes probabilistically constrain the future. Path dependence in ostracism is a key prediction of the emergence account: the learning process should generate increasing returns for repeated interactions with the same social partners, even if these partners were initially randomly selected, as any beneficial interaction (for example, mutual cooperation) with a specific partner will increase the expected value of interacting with this partner in the future 38 .
To test the emergence account, we used a combination of realworld social networks, behavioural laboratory experiments, and computational agent-based modelling. Our experimental model of social interaction (drawing inspiration from theoretical work 37 ) had groups of six participants (players) playing an iterated prisoner's dilemma (experiments 1, 3, 4) or coordination (experiment 2) game for monetary payoffs (Fig. 1) . Each player selected one partner in each experimental period (that is, established a directed link) and could be selected by multiple other players (maximum of 5) as partner in each period. We tested whether the resulting evolving social network would be path-dependent, so that early variability in partner choices would lead some players to become popular and others to be mostly left out (incidental ostracism). In experiment 2 (coordination game), we investigated the incidental emergence of ostracism in a game without free-riding, in order to experimentally rule out instrumental punishment of free-riders as an explanation for ostracism. These two experiments confirmed the prediction that ostracism can be path-dependent and emerge incidentally. We formalized the emergence account as an agent-based reinforcement learning model, which provided a superior account of the data relative to a formalization of the instrumental account, and showed that reinforcement learning mechanisms are sufficient for generating incidental ostracism. Finally (experiments 3 and 4), guided by the mechanistic reinforcement learning model, we devised an experimental intervention that reduced the emergence of incidental ostracism.
results
Real-world social networks confirm a central prediction of the emergence account. Do real-world social networks exhibit the basic characteristics predicted by the incidental emergence account of ostracism? To answer this question, we first analysed four pre-existing longitudinal datasets, involving the formation of friendships in school classes and among college freshmen (see Supplementary Methods for details).
People differed markedly in their popularity in all four social networks. The Gini coefficient, which quantifies the degree of inequality (0 = no inequality, 1 = maximum inequality) in the distribution of a resource (here, popularity), ranged between 0.32 and 0.39. This shows that whereas some people were highly popular, others were ostracized. A core prediction of the emergence account is that popularity (and hence ostracism) will be path-dependent. Path dependence entails that a system's early states probabilistically constrain its future states 38 . In keeping with path dependence, early popularity (the first mapping of the social network) predicted late popularity (the last mapping of the social network) in all four datasets (Fig. 2 , largest P = 0.008).
These data are in line with a central prediction of the emergence account-that there is a positive relationship between early and late popularity-and suggest that ostracism might emerge in an incidental manner in the real world. However, as the datasets did not track the behaviour of the respondents (for example, free-riding), we cannot rule out instrumental ostracism as an explanation for the relationship between early and late popularity. Similarly, we cannot rule out the contribution of stable traits such as attractiveness (for example, students that are more attractive might be more popular both at early and late time points). For these reasons, we next conducted a series of laboratory experiments in which we carefully contrast predictions from the emergence account and the instrumental account, by testing how path dependence and free-riding contribute to ostracism. Note that participants in the experiments were completely anonymous (see Methods). Therefore, individual differences in stable traits (for example, physical attractiveness) can be ruled out as alternative explanations for ostracism. 
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Objective ostracism arises during task and predicts subjective ostracism. In our first experiment, anonymous participants (n = 186) repeatedly selected partners and actions during iterated prisoner's dilemma games in a dynamic social network with fixed size (see Fig. 1 and Supplementary Fig. 1 ). The prisoner's dilemma is the quintessential example of a social dilemma, and is therefore ideal for contrasting the instrumental account with the emergence account of ostracism.
In the experiments, we defined objective ostracism as the difference between the network in-degree (that is, popularity) expected if each player was selected as partner once per round (that is, 35, the absence of ostracism), and the actual in-degree (the total number of times that a participant was chosen as a partner by the other 5 group members). Positive differences therefore indicate players who were selected less than once per period on average, and negative differences indicate players who were selected more than once per period on average. Objective ostracism was thus by definition relative in our experiments; some people were ostracized to the degree that others were popular (that is, ostracism was the inverse of popularity).
First, we used the objective ostracism measure to characterize the distribution of ostracism in our experimental networks. Consistent with the real social networks analysed above, the Gini coefficient was approximately 0.32 (bootstrapped 95% confidence interval, 0.29-0.36), indicating considerable variability in objective ostracism. Furthermore, the distribution of objective ostracism was markedly different from what would have been the case if participants randomly selected a partner in each period (bootstrapped Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: D = 0.34, P < 0.0001, see Fig. 3a ), which corresponds to a Gini coefficient of approxmately 0.087 (95% confidence interval, 0.086-0.089). These results reflect considerable variance in objective ostracism, which is required to compare the different accounts of ostracism.
Next, we confirmed that objective ostracism was highly related to the subjective experience of ostracism. We captured subjective ostracism as the mean of the four fundamental psychological needs measured by the need-threat scale 39 (Cronbach's α = 0.91), a standard measure of subjective ostracism, completed after the experiment. We found a strong predictive relationship such that higher objective ostracism was associated with stronger subjective ostracism (see Fig. 3b ). This relationship remained significant when controlling for total payoff, both with the composite measure and with the individual subscales (see Supplementary Table 2 ). These results demonstrate that our measure of objective ostracism was strongly associated with the subjective experience of ostracism and therefore provide construct validity for our experimental approach 2 .
Objective ostracism is path-dependent as predicted by the emergence account. Next, we contrasted explanations from the instrumental and emergence accounts for the occurrence of objective ostracism in experiment 1. The instrumental account holds that free-riding behaviour should strongly predict ostracism whereas the emergence account predicts that objective ostracism should be path-dependent. Path dependence means that early random variability (that is, variability that is not explained by differences in early behaviour) in who is selected as a partner should have a strong effect on later objective ostracism. In the emergence account, path dependence explains why observed objective ostracism can be incidental rather than instrumental. We found that real social networks exhibit a correlation between early and late popularity, suggestive of path dependence (see 'Real-world social networks confirm a central prediction of the emergence account'). Crucially, here we assessed whether this relationship still holds when free-riding behaviour is accounted for, which is necessary for establishing path dependence as an explanation for incidental ostracism 38 . In other words, pathdependence entails that ostracism should occur even in the absence of free-riding (see Supplementary Note 1 for additional analyses showing that partner choice was sensitive to free-riding, an effect predicted by both accounts), which is not predicted by the instrumental account.
We tested these distinct predictions of the emergence and the instrumental account by assessing how free-riding and path dependence explained later ostracism. Specifically, we used objective ostracism and free-riding behaviour, operationalized as the proportion of 'defect' actions as initiator and responder, during the initial five periods as predictors of objective ostracism in the final 
five period (objective ostracism in the five first periods was positively correlated with free-riding both as initiator and responder (r = 0.45 and r = 0.39, respectively). Variance inflation factor analyses demonstrated that these correlations did not cause problematic regression collinearity: maximum variance inflation factor = 2.94. Moreover, the findings are robust to alternative, non-linear, model specifications, see Supplementary Tables 3, 4) . As predicted by the emergence account, early objective ostracism strongly predicted objective ostracism at the end of the experiment when controlling for free-riding (β = 1.2, s.e. = 0.24, t = 5.1, P < 0.0001, Fig. 4a,b) . By contrast, early free-riding did not reliably predict final objective ostracism, neither as initiator nor as responder (smallest P = 0.09, see Fig. 4b and Supplementary Note 1 for further analyses). In a control analysis, we tested whether path-dependent ostracism was in place also earlier during the experimental session and found that it was. Specifically, we could predict ostracism in periods 11-15 (rather than 31-35) from initial ostracism (β = 1.67, s.e. = 0.21, t = 7.82, P < 0.00001), controlling for free-riding. Thus, our results are robust to the exact number of social interaction periods. Together, path dependence, rather than free-riding, was the best predictor of ostracism, as anticipated by the emergence account.
As an additional test of path dependence, we conducted the same analysis for the subset of participants (n = 64) who never defected as initiator (behaviour as initiator is a more accurate measure of free-riding tendency than as responder, as the latter also includes responses to other players' defections), and again found a strong path-dependent relationship (β = 1.79, s.e. = 0.44, t = 3.9, P < 0.0001). This analysis shows, in analogy to our introductory example about freshman students, that despite having objectively equivalent, or even better, quality as partners, some players initially became, and subsequently stayed, ostracized. Notably, objective ostracism was tightly related to the subjective experience of ostracism also in this subgroup (β = 0.28, s.e. = 0.08, t = 3.58, P < 0.0001), which demonstrates the detrimental subjective consequences of incidental ostracism.
Together, these results demonstrate path dependence for objective ostracism; early variability in objective ostracism best explained later objective ostracism, which indicates that ostracism, as predicted, can, to a large degree, be incidental. The emergence account, but not the instrumental account, fully predicts these results. Thus, ostracism is more incidental than previously assumed.
Path-dependent ostracism in a pure coordination game without free-riding. In experiment 2 (n = 90), we tested whether ostracism would occur and exhibit path dependence in social interactions without the possibility of free-riding. Specifically, participants interacted in a pure coordination game (often referred to as 'choosing sides'). In this game, in contrast to the prisoner's dilemma game, there is no tension between cooperation and selfishness. Instead, to receive a reward, the participants had to coordinate on one of two 
possible actions. This game is often used to exemplify the logic of social norms, such as left-or right-hand side traffic-it does not matter which side you drive on, as long as it is on the same side as everyone else. Accordingly, the instrumental account of ostracism makes no predictions about this type of game, as there is no freeriding to punish. By contrast, our emergence account predicts that ostracism should emerge in much the same way as in the prisoner's dilemma situation of experiment 1.
In line with this prediction, we found that neither the Gini coefficient (= 0.37, 95% confidence interval of the difference compared to experiment 1: − 0.02 to 0.11), nor the distribution (see Supplementary Fig. 4 ) of objective ostracism in experiment 2 were significantly different from those in experiment 1 (KolmogorovSmirnov test: D = 0.06, P = 0.91). Furthermore, the degree of objective ostracism again predicted subjective ostracism ( Supplementary  Fig. 4 ) (controlling for total payoff) (β = 0.28, s.e. = 0.12, t = 2.3, P = 0.02, removing one participant with a standardized residual exceeding 2.5× s.d.: β = 0.32, s.e. = 0.11, t = 2.86, P = 0.005). Thus, ostracism was just as prevalent when free-riding was not possible (experiment 2) as when it was possible (experiment 1).
Crucially, ostracism was path-dependent also in experiment 2 ( Fig. 4c) : the degree of objective ostracism in the first five periods strongly predicted objective ostracism in the final five periods (β = 2.82, s.e. = 0.45, t = 6.63, P < 0.00001). In analogy to experiment 1, we controlled for coordination failures as both initiator and responder (smallest P = 0.18, see Fig. 4d ). Limiting the analysis to participants without coordination failures showed the same pattern (no failures as responder, n = 46, β = 2.57, s.e. = 0.57, t = 4.5, P < 0.0001; no failures as initiator, n = 15, β = 1.39, s.e. = 0.42, t = 3.29, P = 0.004). Thus, experiment 2 demonstrates path-dependent, incidental ostracism in social interactions in which free-riding is not possible. The instrumental account cannot readily explain these results, which in contrast are directly predicted by the emergence account of incidental ostracism.
An agent-based model demonstrates that reinforcement learning mechanisms are sufficient for the incidental emergence of ostracism. Our emergence account postulates that ostracism arises incidentally from the interactions between individuals who select their partners based on simple associative reinforcement learning mechanisms. To formally test this explanation for the incidental ostracism observed in experiments 1 and 2, we developed a generative, agent-based simulation model in which each agent's behaviour was controlled by reinforcement learning mechanisms (the emergence model) 40, 41 . We contrasted the emergence model against a formalization of the instrumental account (the instrumental model). Both models were devoid of parameters that directly regulated group-level characteristics; thus all results arise from the interaction of independent, simple, but psychologically plausible, agents 41 . We first describe the two models. Next, we compare them formally and find that the emergence model explains the individual-level data substantially better than the instrumental model. We then simulate the models to show that the emergence, but not the instrumental, model is sufficient for explaining the path-dependent emergence of incidental ostracism. Finally, we find that the same model generalizes out-of-sample from the prisoner's dilemma (experiment 1) to the coordination game (experiment 2).
Emergence model. The agents selected partners and actions (exactly as in the experiments) and updated the values associated with both through basic reinforcement learning (see Supplementary Methods for details). The basis for each agent was the standard reinforcement learning (Rescorla-Wagner) learning rule, which specifies how the prediction error-the difference between the experienced outcome and the expected outcome-drives learning 42 . Notably, the agents did not instrumentally punish defectors using ostracism, but cared only about their own payoffs from each interaction (as both responder and initiator) (see Supplementary Figs. 
2, 3 for a description of how the model's internal dynamics and parameters generate path-dependent ostracism).
Instrumental model. According to the instrumental account, ostracism is a way to punish free-riders. Therefore, in analogy to strategies for the standard iterated prisoner's dilemma game, the instrumental account is in essence a 'grim' strategy 43 , in which a defecting agent will be deterministically and indefinitely ostracized (not chosen as partner). This basic model was generalized to the full space of more flexible and forgiving strategies, by parameterizing ostracism (as well as prisoner's dilemma action selection) as probabilistic rather than deterministic (see Supplementary Methods for details). Thus, according to the instrumental model, and in contrast to the emergence model, agents instrumentally punish defectors using ostracism, without regard for their own outcomes. The instrumental model therefore corresponds to a behavioural heuristic, conceptually similar to strategies for the repeated prisoner's dilemma game (for example, tit-for-tat).
Model comparison.
We fitted the two models, which had the same number of free parameters (that is, 3), to the individual-level trialby-trial choice data in experiment 1 (n = 186). Model fits served to contrast the relative explanatory power of the two accounts (see Supplementary Methods for details). Model comparison strongly favoured the emergence model: the choices of 168 out of 186 participants were better explained by the emergence model than the instrumental model with a Bayesian information criterion difference (∆ BIC) > 2. In total, 164 participants had ∆ BIC > 10 in favour of the emergence model. Using the Akaike information criterion instead of BIC gives identical results. By contrast, the choices of only four participants were better explained by the instrumental account (see Fig. 5a ). The exceedance probability for the emergence model, which denotes the probability that a model is the most common in the population, was 1 (see Fig. 5b ). These results provide strong support for the emergence model outperforming the instrumental 
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model as an account of the experimental data (see Supplementary  Table 9 for an analysis how estimated model parameters relate to empirical ostracism, and Supplementary Note 2 for a verification that learning, rather than choice perseverance or inertia, is needed to explain our results).
Model validation. Evidence that one model explains the data better than an alternative model is only the first step in model comparison, as a better fit does not guarantee that the winning model can actually reproduce the effects of interest 44 . We used two additional approaches to validate the emergence model: tests of generative performance and model generalizability 44 . First, we tested the capability of the emergence model to reproduce the effects of interest, that is, its generative performance. To this end, we simulated the emergence model (with parameter values fixed to the median of the estimated individual parameters) and submitted the simulated data to the same statistical test as our empirical results. Thus, we tested whether the model, with empirical parameter values, reproduced path-dependent ostracism (note that this is a more stringent criterion than only evaluating the fitted values 44, 45 ). This was indeed the case: as shown in Fig. 6a,b , the emergence model faithfully generated path dependence. By contrast, the instrumental model, based on empirical parameter values, did not (Fig. 6c,d ). This shows, in concert with model comparison, that the emergence model but not the instrumental model easily captures the observed path-dependent ostracism. In Supplementary Note 2 and Supplementary Fig. 9 , we additionally show that the emergence model, but not the instrumental model, readily generates correlations between early and late popularity of the same magnitude as observed in the real-world social networks (Fig. 2) .
Second, we assessed the generalizability of the emergence model by generating out-of-sample predictions (based on parameter values calibrated for experiment 1) for experiment 2. Note that experiments 1 and 2 used different paradigms (prisoner's dilemma and coordination game, respectively), which naturally makes out-of-sample prediction difficult. Despite this difficulty, the model predictions provided a good match to the data (Fig. 7) , which verifies the generalizability of the emergence model (we did not conduct the same analysis for the instrumental model; as free-riding was not possible in the coordination game, the instrumental model does not make any predictions for choice behaviour in experiment 2).
Together, these results demonstrate that a simple reinforcement learning model, without instrumental ostracism, is sufficient for explaining path-dependent incidental ostracism. By contrast, the formalization of the instrumental account was unable to do so. Furthermore, the results show that the same reinforcement learning mechanisms are valid across game types (prisoner's dilemma Ostracism (early) 
versus coordination), which constitutes strong support for the learned basis of ostracism proposed by the emergence account.
Causal manipulation of path dependence reduces objective and subjective ostracism. The model validation clearly supports our account that the incidental emergence of ostracism is caused by basic reinforcement learning mechanisms. To provide even stronger evidence for this view, we next utilized these mechanisms to causally manipulate path dependence, by setting the group on a specific path. We conducted two experiments that varied the strength of this manipulation. In experiment 3 (n = 90), each player was paired up with another player in the first period and then allowed to freely select partners for the remaining 35 periods (exactly as in experiment 1). Similarly, in experiment 4 (n = 90), we initially paired each player up with another player but this time for the first five periods, and then allowed them to freely select partners for the remaining 35 periods. In both experiments 3 and 4, the social interaction during paired and free choice trials occurred in the form of the prisoner's dilemma game (as in experiment 1; experiment 1 was also comparable to experiments 3 and 4 in the distribution of participant age, gender and the degree of free-riding, see Supplementary Note 1). The model, with parameters estimated from experiment 1, predicted that this manipulation of path dependence would reduce objective ostracism, if free-riding during the paired periods is accounted for (which should increase ostracism according to both incidental and instrumental accounts: predicted β = 3.7) (Fig. 8) . In other words, the emergence model predicts that path dependence can be leveraged as an intervention against the emergence of incidental ostracism, by pairing up players.
The proportion of periods in which the players selected the same partner as they interacted with in the first period (experiment 1: 0.17, experiment 3: 0.39, experiment 4: 0.5), was considerably higher in experiments 3 and 4 than in experiment 1 (experiment 3 versus experiment 1: t 101.34 = 5.47, P < 0.0001; experiment 4 versus experiment 1: t 98.76 = 7.48, P < 0.0001). The tendency to stick with the same partner was furthermore slightly stronger in experiment 4 than experiment 3 (t 175.6 = 1.96, P = 0.049). These results show that the manipulation was successful in setting the group on a particular path (see Supplementary Figs. 5 and 6 and Supplementary Note 1 for additional analyses of path dependence in experiments 3 and 4). Next, we tested the model prediction that manipulating path dependence would reduce objective ostracism (Fig. 8a) . Confirming this prediction, objective ostracism, averaged across the entire experiment, was significantly lower in experiment 3 (β = − 6.79, s.e. = 2.76, t = − 2.46, P = 0.015) and in experiment 4 (β = -7.712, s.e. = 2.82, t = − 2.74, P = 0.007) than in experiment 1 ( Fig. 8b ; see also Supplementary Table 5 for nonlinear model specifications). Objective ostracism in experiments 3 and 4 did not differ significantly (P = 0.76), although the difference was in the predicted direction (Fig. 8a) . Similarly, objective ostracism was lower also in the last five periods in experiment 3 (β = − 0.95, s.e. = 0.47, t = − 2.04, P = 0.042) and experiment 4 (β = − 1.08, s.e. = 0.47, t = − 2.27, P = 0.024) than in experiment 1. In these analyses, we controlled for free-riding in the initial (that is, 1 or 5) paired periods, which, as the model predicted, in itself increased objective ostracism (β = 7.93, s.e. = 1.81, t = 6.72, P < 0.0001). Thus, while free-riding in the initial paired periods predicted being ostracized later, our analysis accounts for this variance, and shows that for an average participant (that is, at the sample mean of free-riding in the paired periods), imposing path dependence reduces objective ostracism. This reduction was brought about by a stronger tendency to form lasting, mutual dyads ('friendships') rather than an increase in network interconnectedness between all group members (see Supplementary Note 1 and Supplementary Fig. 7 for additional analyses) .
Imposing path dependence also reduced the inequality in objective ostracism: both experiments 3 (0.26) and 4 (0.25) had lower Gini coefficients (adjusted for free-riding in the paired periods) than experiment 1 (bootstrapped 95% confidence interval for difference between experiment 1 and experiment 3: -0.11 to -0.006, between experiment 1 and experiment 4: − 0.11 to − 0.02), see Supplementary Fig. 8 for Lorenz curves). Finally, we found that imposing path dependence also led to a reduction in the subjective experience of ostracism. Subjective ostracism was reduced in both experiments 3 (β = − 0.66, s.e. = 0.17, t = -3.78, P < 0.001) and 4 (β = − 0.7, s.e. = 0.17, t = -4.0, P < 0.0001) relative to experiment 1 (Fig. 8c) . Together, these results provide strong evidence for the reinforcement learning basis of incidental ostracism, and demonstrate that path dependence, which in itself is a signature of incidental ostracism, can be leveraged as an intervention to reduce both objective and subjective ostracism.
Discussion
Our results demonstrate that a substantial proportion of ostracism can be incidental and emerge from simple reinforcement learning mechanisms. Thus, rather than being restricted to the traditionally assumed instrumental response to the free-riding of others, 
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ostracism occurred in our experiments to a large degree in the absence of free-riding. The emergence account of ostracism offers a distinct view on how the basic components of social interactionsselecting partners and establishing relationships-can lead to a substantial degree of ostracism, both expressed in objective social network structure and subjective experience. Furthermore, it provides clues of how ostracism can be reduced. Note that our findings do not disprove previous theoretical and empirical demonstrations of the power of ostracism to prevent free-riding, but suggest that commonly observed ostracism might be less instrumental than previously thought. Our use of agent-based computational modelling with empirically estimated parameters allowed us to demonstrate that basic reinforcement learning mechanisms, without motivation for instrumental ostracism, are sufficient for explaining the results. By contrast, formalization of the instrumental account provided a worse fit to the experimental data, and failed to account for path-dependent ostracism. According to our model, path-dependent ostracism originated from a positive feedback mechanism captured by reinforcement learning, as consecutive rewarding interactions with a given partner cumulatively increase the probability of selecting the same partner again in the future, at the expense of selecting alternative partners. Naturally, this implies that path dependence can also occur in many non-social decision-making situations in which the environment provides structurally similar positive or negative feedback 38 . Our results further expand the scope of simple reinforcement learning mechanisms for explaining seemingly complex social behaviours, such as economic game behaviour 46 , social network structure 37 , behavioural traditions 47 and social cognition 48 . Although the agent-based model shows that instrumental ostracism is not necessary for explaining the experimental results, we cannot exclude that some participants did have instrumentally punitive motivations for their partner choices. However, our analysis puts a clear upper bound on instrumental ostracism in our experiments, by showing that free-riding is a weak predictor of ostracism when path dependence is accounted for (Fig. 4) and that incidental ostracism emerges also in a social setting in which free-riding is not an option (experiment 2). An intriguing possibility for real-world ostracism is the interaction between incidental and instrumental ostracism, so that incidental outcasts become stigmatized, for example, if observers view ostracism as a signal of deviance ('no smoke without fire'), which could result in subsequent instrumental ostracism of the same individuals.
Our findings have policy implications, as they provide an alternative explanation for the prevalence of ostracism, and make new suggestions for preventive interventions. Specifically, experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated that incidental ostracism can be reduced by utilizing path dependence to enforce dyadic interaction between group members. The reduction of ostracism was brought about by an enhanced tendency for individuals to form stable mutual dyads (friendships) rather than an increased interconnectivity between all group members. Such mechanistically informed strategies represent important complements to previously suggested methods for preventing ostracism 3, 4 , for example, in school classes. Several limitations should be noted. Our experimental model, which was stylized and based on economic games with monetary payoffs, does not directly speak to forms of instrumental ostracism targeted at individuals who are not free-riders in a standard sense. For example, previous research has shown that people ostracize slow individuals in a virtual ball-tossing game (cyberball 49 ) 24, 25 . Such individuals are not free-riders per se but burdensome, in that they cause frustration and reduce the per-unit time payoff to the focal individual (who typically knew the total numbers of rounds in the experiment 25 ). However, our emergence account may well generalize to such situations, as interacting with burdensome individuals probably results in lower than average payoffs, which in turn promotes avoidance. In any case, evaluating the emergence models in other experimental situations, involving non-monetary payoffs, represents an important future direction. Other forms of punitive ostracism, such as the silent treatment between spouses 28 , fall outside our emergence account. Moreover, as our experiments were based on dyadic interactions, in which the participants had no knowledge about the payoffs of group members that they did not interact with, our findings do not speak to the role of welfare or group-level payoff concerns for the emergence of incidental ostracism. This intriguing question could, for example, be addressed by combining dyadic interaction with group interactions (for example, in a public goods game). Finally, given that our experimental model 
by design is highly simplified, it is likely that additional factors contribute to ostracism in real-world social situations (for example, prior information about other individuals or physical appearance 50 ). We view our experimental and computational model as a baseline to which such additional factors can be added.
In summary, our experiments and computational modelling provide new insights into the mechanistic causes of ostracism in groups of interacting people. Understanding ostracism as an emergent phenomenon has important ramifications for the analysis of its social function, and for designing interventions to combat ostracism. Each experimental period began with a partner choice stage ( Fig. 1 ) during which each player was indicated with a number (for example, player 1) in a matrixlike representation (see Supplementary Fig. 1 for a period time line and additional information). After partner choices, the participants were prompted to select an action (as initiator) for the interaction with the selected partner. The actions were referred to as action A and action B (rather than cooperate and defect) to avoid pronounced framing effects. The participants were then sequentially notified about which other players had selected them as partner, and asked to indicate their action in this interaction (as responder). Next, the payoffs for the initiator and the responder were displayed on their respective screens for each selection (thus, the action of the interaction partners was not explicitly stated and participants inferred it from the simple payoff matrix). If more than one player had selected a given player as partner, these interactions were realized in randomized order. Players who had not been selected as partners during a period waited until all interactions had been realized. Participants were not notified about the number of periods, to prevent end-game effects. The experiments began with written instructions, specifying the payoff matrix and the game rules (see Supplementary Methods for instructions), which was followed by a quiz to verify understanding. After the experiments, the participants filled in a computerized version of the need-threat scale 39 , a standard measurement of subjective ostracism. The scale is composed of four subscales, designed to measure the fundamental psychological needs of belonging, self-esteem, meaningful existence and sense of control. We averaged and reversed the subscales as a compact index of subjective ostracism.
Experiments 3 and 4 additionally included instructions that participants would be paired with another player for one period (experiment 3) or an undisclosed (to prevent 'end' game effects) number of periods (experiment 4) before they would be free to select partners for the prisoner's dilemma interaction. Instructions and procedures of these two experiments were kept as close to experiment 1 as possible.
Experiment 1 had two payoff conditions: the cumulative payoff condition (n = 78) and the randomized payoff (n = 108) condition. In the former, the payoff from each prisoner's dilemma interaction in each period was summed up. In the latter, the payoff from one interaction in each period was randomly selected. To balance the monetary profit between the conditions, the randomized payoff condition had a five times higher conversion rate from experimental currency units to CHF. The randomized payoff condition was intended to mimic the natural variability in the reinforcement provided for one's behaviour by the social environment as a test of robustness. Incidental ostracism was generalized across the two reinforcement environments (Supplementary Note 1) . Experiments 2-4 were all based on the randomized payoff condition.
The payoff condition was crossed with a condition in which the popularity (that is, in-degree) of each player from the previous period was displayed during the partner choice stage (that is, visible (n = 96) versus not visible (n = 90)). This condition had no discernable effects on the results, and is for this reason only reported in Supplementary Supplementary Tables 3-6 
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